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INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
IN LATIN AMERICA 
 




Economic theory has proposed and discussed a lot of possible factors or explanations 
that promote or foster economic development. One of these gathers specific discussions from 
other  Social  Sciences,  incorporating  social,  cultural,  religious,  institutional  and  political 
dimensions – and among them, the idea of 'social capital'. Although the discussion held by 
Putnam on the benefits of association, civic involvement and interpersonal trust is extremely 
rich, this paper incorporates the discussion advocated by the World Bank, and the central 
ideas of Woolcock and Narayan papers, since they extend the scope of analysis, making what 
is called 'synergic vision' of social capital. These authors consider that "social capital does not 
exist in a political vacuum", ie there is no way to separate the elements that characterize the 
social and the political and institutional elements that surround it. The 'community social 
capital' of Putnam cannot be understood without the macro-environment in which it operates. 
This  paper  aims  to  explain  the  economic  behavior  in  Latin  America,  considering  the 
importance of the attributes directly related to social capital (interpersonal trust, which leads 
to  the  association  and  civic  involvement,  pari  passu  governance  ie  the  formal  attributes 
related to the action of the state, which establishes social, political and economic behavior. It 
wants to explain if these two dimensions are correlated in order to explain the behavior of 
agents in different economies in Latin America and their economic development.  
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INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  





Countries have different conditions for economic growth and development, which are 
commonly  linked  to  the  availability  of  traditional  production  factors:  physical,  financial, 
human and natural capitals. More than half a century after the initial ideas proposed by Robert 
Solow,
2 the Theory of Economic Development has incorporated factors and variables that 
were originally outside the traditional model – because only purely economic explanations 
fail to explain development issues. Contemporaneously it is investigated the contributions of 
political, social, cultural and institutional conditions, incorporating the studies based on the 
role of social capital and institutional.  
Social capital theory has been incorporated into economic literature from studies of 
non-economists. After the initial thoughts in the field of Sociology – by Pierre Bourdieu and 
James  Coleman  (1988,  1990)  –  the  subject  was  handled  by  the  political  scientist  Robert 
Putnam (1993, 1995). These authors introduced the theoretical basis for the incorporation of 
social capital as an important production factor and with effects and impacts on economic 
activity.
3 While the definitions are different, it is understood social capital as "[...] features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993:167).  
The  comprehension  of  institutions  and  their  contribution  to  economics  is 
contemporary to the debate about social capital, and is related to the original contribution of 
Douglas North (1989, 1990, 1991). The author summarizes the institutions as the 'rules of the 
game', which constitute a guide to economic activities and interactions. 
At the intersection of these two concepts, there is the 'institutional' approach of social 
capital as recommended by the World Bank.
4 This approach highlights that the vitality of 
                                            
2 Solow initial ideas were published in two articles: Solow, R. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.70, n.1, p.65-94, 1956., and Solow, R. Technical change and the 
aggregate production function. Review of Economics and Statistics, v.39, n.3, p.312-320, 1957. 
3 The introduction to the book of Svendsen and Svendsen (2009) uses the analogy to a troika to describe the 
analysis  of  social  capital:  an  intersection  of  knowledge  derived  from  Economics,  Sociology  and  Political 
Science. 
4 Especially from the papers of Woolcock and Narayan. These authors describe the 'evolution' of the concept of 
social capital, from the "community vision" advocated by Putnam to the vision of "network" and then extend it 
to  the  "institutional"  approach  and  present  their  own  understanding,  translated  in  the  "synergic  vision" 
(Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 3 
social relations is dictated by the institutional framework – political, institutional and legal 
systems in which personal relationships (and interpersonal trust) are established. The 'synergic 
vision' – an extrapolation beyond the institutional approach
5 – emphasizes the synergy and the 
feedback process between social capital and institutional environment. Structures, rules and 
regulations established by the State, through its institutions and political system, constantly 
interact with the dynamics of social organization of society, whether at horizontal or vertical 
levels, being constantly affected by it and affecting them in the same way. Likewise formal 
institutions need the involvement and social commitment, otherwise 'empty institutions' are 
useless  to  (eg:  rules  are  not  followed  or  the  existence  or  prevalence  of  corruption  to 
circumvent the legal system). This 'synergic' approach contemplates at the same time the 
conditions of reciprocity and trust (that are related to community level social capital) and 
institutional  aspects,  such  as  contract  enforcement,  rule  of  law  and  guaranteed  civil  and 
political liberties. Interpersonal trust and reciprocity are established in an iterative process 
with the institutional environment.  
Governance is a broad term that covers the exercise of authority by the State in order 
to achieve the collective welfare. World Bank (1991:23) defines governance as resulted by the 
interaction of three aspects: "(i) the form of political regime [...]; (ii) the process by which 
authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources; and 
(iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies […]". It covers 
items such as "[...] institutional quality of government, including the respect for civil and 
political rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, enforcement of contracts, and 
prevalence of law and order" (Loayza et al. 2005:41), since they are regarded as responsible 
for economic dynamism, along with more traditional factors and the political structures and 
institutions. 
But  is  there  consensus  on  the  role  of  institutions  and  social  capital  on  economic 
activity? This is the central subject of this paper that discusses the importance and influence 
of both concepts  to economic development, focusing in  Latin America  environment. The 
purpose of the paper is to present a literature revision on the theoretical framework of social 
capital and institutions and the initial findings that investigate the relationship between both 
of them and economic performance in the region. 
 
                                            
5 Woolcock and Narayan believe that this approach could exclude people from the center of the analysis of social 
capital, incurring potential risk of a crowding out process: reinforcing the importance of formal institutions, this 
approach can undermine the importance given to the civil society behavior. 4 
 
The theoretical framework  
 
The Theory of Economic Development has highlighted the importance of traditional 
production  factors  for  the  generation  of  wealth  in  a  country  or  region  –  natural, 
physical/financial  and  human  capitals  –  opening  an  analytical  scope  for  establishing 
relationships between them and among them and the real economic activity. However, "for 
more than forty years, then, the role of national and local institutions – political, legal, and 
social  –  were  largely  neglected" to  understanding  the  growth  and economic  development 
(Woolcock 2001:66). Despite the valuable contribution of neo-classical theory, one should 
also consider its limitations:  
[…] When applied to economic history and development it focused on technological development and 
more recently human capital investment, but ignored the incentive structure embodied in institutions 
that  determined  the  extent  of  societal  investment  in  those  factors.  In  the  analysis  of  economic 
performance through time it contained two erroneous assumptions: one that institutions do not matter 
and two that time does not matter (North 1993)
6. 
 
Aware  of  these  criticisms,  other  factors  beyond  strictly  economical  ones  were 
highlighted and it was possible to study the contribution and role of social, historical, cultural, 
or political variables to the theory of development.
7 One theoretical approach incorporates the 
benefits and virtues of civic life, local associations and interpersonal trust, and another one 
covers the existence of some 'rules of the game' for economic activity. 
The economic interests on social capital arises from the diffusion of works by James 
Coleman (1988, 1990) and Robert Putnam (1993;  1995), who extends and completes the 
former. Putnam (1993) presents the results of nearly twenty years of observations about the 
unequal  economic  conditions  between  the  'northern'  and  'southern'  Italy,  confirming  the 
positive effects of 'civic community' on economic activity. The 'bundle of virtues' of the civic 
environment includes placements beyond the simple pursuit of individual interests as stated 
by (1) civic participation, (2) political equality, (3) solidarity, trust and tolerance, and (4) 
associational life, a summary of what is called social capital.  
Social capital, synthesized in the civic community, the associative involvement and 
social connections affect positively people's lives and improve them. The economic effect of 
                                            
6 Prize lecture of Douglass North, when receiving the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1993. Available at: 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html>. 
7 Indeed, the inclusion of social elements in economic theory and literature has always been present. In the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Adam  Smith's  work  incorporates  social  concepts  in  his  analysis  on  the 
behavior of agents and on the functioning of the economy, because "not all economic action derives from what 
are traditionally known as economic reasons" (Fukuyama 1996:33 ). 5 
social capital can be understood this way: norms and networks of civic engagement "[...] 
foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. 
Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow 
dilemmas of collective action to be resolved" (Putnam 1995). The incentives for opportunistic 
action by agents decrease because of the formal and moreover informal social rules, and 
interaction networks that are stated between them. 
The  analysis  of  potential  contributions  of  social  capital  to  economic  growth  and 
development does not compete with the institutional analysis.
8 Considering the 'rules of the 
game',  Putnam  believes  that  respecting  them  (or  not)  are  not  imposed,  but  are  taught  or 
learned from our own living community. 
Living in society, around a broad array of social relations, implies the establishment 
and acceptance of rules, because "in social interactions, individuals deal with one another on 
the basis of some presumption of what they are being offered and what they can expect to 
get", ie "[…] on some basic presumption of trust" (Sen 1999). Trust and reciprocity arise out 
of interpersonal  relationships –  from social  capital, therefore – or  out of  the institutional 
environment.  Social  interactions  and  economic  activity  take  place  in  an  environment  of 
limited rationality and subject to opportunistic behavior, given the inability to understand, 
know or predict the behavior of other people. 
Institutions  have  been  defined  by  North  (1990)  as  "[...]  more  formally,  […]  the 
humanly  devised  constraints  that  shape  human  interaction.  In  consequence  they  structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic." These rules are linked 
to  the  development  of  economic  activities  of  any  kind  –  production,  distribution  and 
exchange.  The  ultimate  goal  of  existence  of  institutions  is  to  constrain  the  opportunistic 
human behavior, collaborating to reduce transaction costs. 
In initial stages of economic development trust can be considered only in interpersonal 
way, as people are required to establish personal and personalistic relations with their frequent 
economic interlocutors. With the evolution of economic activities is demanded more than 
interpersonal trust – it is needed general confidence. This depends on both personal attributes 
(honesty and integrity, for example), motivators of social nature (social rules of conduct, 
enforced  by  informal  ties  that  are  established between  individuals)  or  institutional  nature 
(rules imposed by the formal apparatus). It is fundamental the emergence and maintenance of 
                                            
8  On  the  contrary:  the  book  'Making  democracy  work'  of  Robert  Putnam  begins  with  comments  about 
institutions! The initial chapters of the book deal with the 'Changing the rules: two decades of institutional 
development'  and  'Measuring  institutional  performance'.  The  author  states  however  that  institutions  are 
considered as resultants from the process of social interaction and social capital construction. 6 
institutions that guarantee or induce compliance to contracts and cooperative behavior, while 
restricting opportunistic behavior. 
It  makes  sense  to  think  of  social  capital  as  complementary  to  the  institutional 
environment (Fukuyama 2000). Nowadays it is not possible to establish economic relations 
based on interpersonal trust, ie on social capital solely. Although the economic effects of 
social capital are evident, and perceived in decreasing transaction costs, in any society it is 
necessary  to  have  formal  institutions,  since  cooperation  mechanisms  do  not  develop 
automatically as suggested by the theory of "invisible hand of the market": 
No one will volunteer to work for a neighborhood organization if the police cannot guarantee public 
safety; no one will trust the government if public officials are immune to prosecution; no one will sign a 
business contract with a stranger in the absence of tort law and enforceable contracts (Fukuyama 2002). 
 
On the other hand, understand institutions isolated of the social capital can lead to the 
'institutional  temptation'  of  having  a  unique  solution  despite  of  the  social  and  cultural 
contexts. 
The economic environment is permeated by a broad spectrum of formal and informal 
rules.  On  one  hand,  it  can  be  understood  that  "when  economic  and  political  dealing  is 
embedded  in  dense  networks  of  social  interaction,  incentives  for  opportunism  and 
malfeasance are reduced" (Putnam 1995). In other hand economic activity is linked not only 
to economic institutions, but also to political ones. These are responsible in last stand for the 
institutional framework, once they design property rights and the legal system and rules to 
manage  and  coordinate  economic  action  and  ensure  contract  enforcement.  Economic 
performance – growth and development – are influenced or shaped by institutions that are 
defined, ultimately, out of economic activity. 
Given that economic institutions are shaped in the political sphere, it is possible to 
understand the position of North (1990): "in a zero-transaction-cost world, bargaining strength 
does not affect the efficiency of outcomes, but in a world of positive transaction costs it does 
and given the lumpy indivisibilities that characterize institutions, it shapes the direction of 
long-run economic change". On the opposite shore, institutions can be ineffective in reducing 
opportunistic behavior, since there may be individuals who get benefits derived from free-
rider  behaviors or  rent-seek activities. In this case, institutions would not be  designed to 
attend a public good, but to attain the interests of exclusive groups or 'cliques'.
9 The net 
impact of this behavior can be disastrous, because "poor governance increases transaction 
costs,  encourages  unproductive  activities  such  as  lobbying  and  reduces  transparency. 
                                            
9 Borner, Bodmer and Kobler (2004) emphasize that the existence of institutions that do not ensure rule of the 
law are characteristic of many developing countries. 7 
Therefore,  it  leads  to  an  erroneous  allocation  of  resources  and  discourages  new 
investment"(World Bank 2009). 
On one side there are reasons for believing that social capital promotes cooperation 
among agents, contributing to the design of networks and social interaction, and thus reducing 
opportunism. There is evidence that good institutions and good governance remain in "the 
effective functioning of bureaucracies, regulatory frameworks, civil liberties, and transparent 
and accountable institutions for ensuring the rule of law and participation matters for growth 
and development" (Thomas et al. 2000:XXIX). 
By maintaining the institutional conditions lubricated and on proper functioning as 
well as the interpersonal trust, the consequences on economic activity would be positive and 
welcome. Social restrictions formally or informally bounded reduce the cost of interaction 
between agents, and forego the individual assessment of partners with which they establish 
economic transactions.  
On the other hand social capital can also have negative effects, in order to create or 
force ties and interpersonal trust among just a few people – which leads to the exclusion of 
'outsiders', the establishment of rules and requirements for entrance and permanence in the 
group, and restrictions to individual freedom. The excess of regulatory standards can also lead 
to  institutional  rigidities  and  formal  barriers  in  order  to  hinder  or  prevent  the  access  to 
economic benefits of a notorious portion of the population. The trust maintained only through 
the use of formal institutions can be potentially harmful to economic output as well. Faced 
with potentially problematic situations, "societies which rely heavily on the use of force are 
likely  to  be  less  efficient,  more  costly,  and  more  unpleasant  than  those  where  trust  is 
maintained by other means" (Gambetta 1988, apud Putnam 1993:165).
10 This is because the 
motivators of State and society are different: while the government seeks for claim through 
coercion, civil society – through social capital – can do it via voluntary cooperation. 
Being  social  and  historical  constructions,  existing  institutions  may  not  reflect 
collective interests, but respond to concerns of individual or dominant groups. This can occur 
in  societies  where  there  is  a  system  of  'castes',  'tribes',  'neighborhoods',  privileged  social 
classes, or patrimonial patron-client relations or difficulties in accessing education, financial 
resources and minimal conditions for citizenship. These perceived limitations on economic 
mobility and social institutions can work to serve a few privileged groups and exclude others. 
                                            
10 Gambetta, Diogo. 1988. “Can we trust trust?” In Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations, edited by 
Diogo Gambetta, 221. Oxford: Blackwell. 8 
This disadvantaged 'background' and individual behaviors can drain effort, time and resources 
from productive activities, and legitimate economic purposes, to rent-seeking activities. 
From North's ideas one can conclude his eminent concern in understanding why the 
institutions of a country are positively related to good economic conditions, while in others 
the past didn’t developed institutions that ensures or guarantees economic results. Despite this 
paper walks in an opposite direction to North, its concerns is about economic development 
and growth conditions in Latin America and what relationship can be established together 
with social capital and institutional governance. Specifically when looking at Latin America, 
the  findings  in  this  regard  are  of  two  natures.  The  region  gets  the  lowest  levels  of 
interpersonal and institutional trust among all democratic economies, ie, it has low social 
capital, based on the terms proposed by Putnam. On the other hand it is also noted that "a 
unique culture of transgression exists in Latin America" (Sorj and Martuccelli 2008:158), 
based on 'legalistic tradition' of the continent, the existence of institutions that distinguish 
citizens – often on economic basis – and the acceptance or tolerance to the disregard of legal 
norms. Thus, both interpersonal trust and institutional governance in Latin America seem 
weak. 
 
The context being examined: interpersonal and institutional trust in Latin America 
 
Latin America, in broad lines, can be understood as an unreliable region and part of its 
economic  performance  –  growth  and  development  conditions  –  may  be  related  to  it  or 
explained by this subject.  
Results  of  opinion  polls  that  study  the  region  stress  that  it  has  low  levels  of 
interpersonal  and  institutional  trust,
11  including  lack  of  confidence  in  judiciary,  police, 
political parties and Congress. If social capital is understood as "an individual sacrifice (time, 
effort, consumption) made in an effort to promote cooperation with others" (Oxoby 2009:5), 
one can easily conclude that Latinos are not willing to forsake personal interests because they 
understand  this  'sacrifice'  as  in  vain  as  there  is  a  huge  suspicion  that  they  will  not  find 
reciprocity of this altruistic behavior in the future. 
Latin America has a common heritage of mistrust, and low interpersonal trust is at the 
heart of the problem of low trust in institutions: "if not even people are trusted, how can 
institutions be trusted" (Lagos 1997)? 
                                            
11 Rennó (2001) is one of the authors that stress this fact, and so are Lagos (1997), Lopes (2004), Ottone (2007), 
Calderón (2008) and Moisés (2010). All of them argument about the lack of confidence in Latin America, based 
on results of public opinion polls. 9 
The existence of low confidence may be related to historical conditions. It is observed 
relationship between the institutional behavior in Latin America and the Iberian colonial past. 
While the United States knew how to strength  institutions originally developed in Great 
Britain – especially those related to property rights – Latin America institutional structures 
remained linked to the metropolitan origin; conditions present in the XVI-XVIII centuries in 
Portugal and Spain have been reproduced in Latin America (North 1989; North et al. 1999).  
Bureaucratic structures of governance that existed in former Portugal and Spain in 
order to manage the colonies businesses can be summarized in the personalistic political and 
economic  relations,  state  regulation,  and  property  rights  poorly  defined.  This  behavior 
induced  and  maintained  rent-seeking  activities  in  the  colonies,  which  may  have  been 
perpetuated in XXI century Latin America (Bjørnskov 2009). Once these activities are linked 
to  specific  groups,  that  represent  the  'exclusive  groups'  advocated  by  Olson  (1974),  the 
potential benefits can be restrained to people who are part of the selected group. Maybe the 
assimilation and the unequal appropriation of the benefits generated in colonial times are still 
contemporary and responsible for intrapersonal low confidence in Latin America?  
There is a gap "[…] – if not the abyss — between the de jure country and the de facto 
country, or between what the law prescribes and the social reality actually allows (the famous 
'it is respected but not obeyed' from the colonial era)" (Sorj and Martuccelli 2008:126). This 
dissociation between the de jure and the de facto may explain part of the interpersonal and 
institutional  distrust.  This  flexible  and  moldable  behavior  of  people  results  in  the  'Latin 
America way', a double-edged sword, at the same time a vice and a virtue. It also underlies 
the understanding of a transgressive behavior, in which the disregard for legality is rewarded 
and not punished. Whereas the "equality is a legal standard and a value, not a fact; is not an 
assertion, but rather a prescription" (Ottone 2007:23), breaking rules and not obeying the laws 
is an assumption almost 'natural', and people who comply their obligations are considered 
'fools'. 
In Latin American politics one can see a lot of examples of the presence of oligarchs 
and political centralization. Overflows and spillovers are inevitable in the economic area, 
once institutions can have traces of this conduct, responding to concerns of certain groups. 
There  are  visible  hints  of  patronage,  nepotism  and  private  usage  of  public  patrimonial 
structure.  Lagos  (1997)  proves  her  thesis  in  reverse  way:  instead  of  having  institutional 
distrust,  Latin  America  has  the  "institutionalization  of  distrust"  (a  plethora  of  licenses, 
certificates and formal evidences of goodwill that are necessary in order to establish economic 
exchanges). In Latin America there is a tangle of personal and bureaucratic connections that 10 
go beyond the formal structure. Establishing these personal relationships – or 'connections' – 
contributes to enable the access to public benefits or services, once without these connections 
the formal system is perceived as intangible to ordinary people. These 'opens gates' in the 
functioning of State make the ground fertile to the flourish of illegal or unlawful activities 
(Sorj and Martuccelli 2008). 
This understanding is supported by Fukuyama (2000), that uses the idea of 'radius of 
trust' to present his findings. Latin America would have two parallel systems, with different 
'radii of trust': one valid for close friends and family and another for other people (generally 
called the 'others'). As a result, social capital would reside only in the family and groups of 
friends;  'strangers'  fall  into  another  category.  The  excessive  concern  with  private  and/or 
nuclear family and the reluctance to engage with public or collectives issues would lead to an 
excessive individualism. It's the idea behind the concept of 'amoral familism': a person feels 
morally bounded only to his/her family, excluding any cooperation possibility derived from 
impersonal  social  interactions.  Social  relations  are  undermined  and  consequently  the 
possibility of establishing economic relations – then institutions are 'less able' (or have less 
power) than 'family and friends'. 
Booth  and  Richard  (2009)  observed  positive  correlation  between  the  existence  of 
formal groups and democratic institutions over time, and that informal groups are inversely 
correlated with the longevity of democracy.
12 The authors propose that the years of political 
repression – including also civil wars – may have contributed to the establishment of informal 
groups, limiting the public exposure needed to constitute formal networks. 
Political regimes in Latin America that used repression and individual surveillance 
over time may have held political activity within strict limits and tried to destroy participatory 
culture (Klesner, 2004). It is possible to correlate low confidence with some marks of political 
authoritarianism, and the lack of confidence of the population is considered a response, "a 
form  of  survival  compared  to  the  past  and  history"  (Lopes  2004).
13  Interpersonal  and 
institutional  distrust  that  characterize  low  social  capital  in  Latin  America  seems  to  have 
emerged from and been fostered through formal institutions. The attitude to remain silent and 
the  passivity  in  face  of  political,  economic  and  social  environments  would  be  some 
consequences of this mistrust. 
                                            
12  Considering  eight  Latin  American  countries:  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. 
13  Evans  (1996:  1120) examined  the  impact  of  political  regimes  on  social  capital.  He  concluded about  the 
process of trust destruction in Latin American countries motivated by years of totalitarian regime. This fact led 
to an "[…] 'angry atomization' of society, which leaves no space for self-organization at the bottom". Political 
regimes also change the conditions for generating synergy between State and society. 11 
Finally, another possible explanation for the low interpersonal and institutional trust is 
related to income inequality that characterizes Latin America, given that "in highly unequal 
societies,  people  will  stick  with  their  own  kind"  (Uslaner  2009).  Perhaps  this  structural 
deficiency  of  Latin  American  economies  reinforce  exclusionary  conducts  because 
"perceptions of [social] injustice will reinforce negative stereotypes of other groups, making 
trust and accommodation more difficult" or enable the understanding of attitudes such amoral 





The common historical origins of the Latin American countries can contributes to a 
possible explanation for the distrust and disbelief in public activities, once public space is 
understood  as  being  of  'no  one'  rather  than  being  of  'all  the  people'.  It  also  enables  the 
comprehension about the avoidance of involvement with political activities. 
Latin America presents great risks associated with the low representation and political 
mediation  and  the  low  involvement  of  its  inhabitants  with  collective  nature  issues.
15 
Interpersonal and institutional distrust presents statistically significant relationships with the 
disadvantageous  terms  of  economic  activity  in  Latin  America:  "clearly,  there  can  be  no 
political stability without economic growth, and sustained growth is impossible without a 
solid  democratic  institutional  basis"  (Lagos  1997).  The  consequences  of  mistrust  and 
problematic social capital confirm the thoughts that Adam Smith developed centuries ago: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular 
administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their 
property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state 
is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able 
to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a 





                                            
14 Also Jordahl (2009) relates social capital through trust and less income inequality, concluding that "society is 
seen as a zero-sum game between conflicting groups and this is reflected in lower levels of trust" (p.325). 
15 One of the most classical studies in this area concludes that a significant part total factor productivity growth 
rate found in Latin American economies in the 40 previous years, "can reflect a drop in efficiency in the private 
and public sectors as a result of misguided policies and weak institutions" (BARRO, R. 1999. Notes on growth 
accounting.  Journal of Economic Growth 4(2) apud Loayza et al. 2005). Also Fukuyama (2002) notes that one 
of the reasons that could explain the low growth in Latin America when compared to East Asian countries is the 
quality of the institutions present in both regions because in societies where people cooperate and work together 
can emerge powerful and efficient state institutions. 12 
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